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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Larry Matthew Hoak appeals from the judgment entered upon a jury
verdict finding him guilty of felony stalking and being a persistent violator,
challenging the admission of certain evidence offered to prove Hoak's course of
conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Criminal Proceedings
Hoak verbally and physically abused his girlfriend, Kathy Hendricks, over
several months.

(See

generally Trial Tr., pp.118-298 (victim's testimony

regarding physical abuse and threats including threats to cut her legs off and
threats to burn her house down with her in it; Exhibits 1A - 1C (pictures of
bruises).)

Hoak continued to contact and threaten Kathy while he was

incarcerated for incidents involving Kathy and despite the existence of a no
contact order. (Trial Tr., p.134, L.13 -p.135, L.7, p.168, L.7-p.171, L.14,
p.366, L.17

- p.367, L.21, p.367, L.22 - p.377, L.7; Exhibits 2-7, 9-13.)

During

one period of incarceration, after Kathy had broken up with Hoak, Hoak wrote
several letters to Kathy. (Trial Tr., p.193, L.22 - p.255, L.4; Exhibits 2-7, 9) In
one letter, Hoak referenced a prior threat in which he told Kathy he was going to
cut her head off. (Trial Tr., p.219, L.17

- p.220,

L.17; Exhibit 4.) Hoak also

made numerous attempts to contact Kathy by telephone, including attempts
through third parties since Kathy had her home phone number changed. (Trial
TF., p.194, Ls.19-25, p.243, L.3 - p.244, L.23, p.246, L.24 - p.247, L.24, pp.302,
314-319, 332-334; Exhibits 16, 17.)

As a result of Hoak's behavior, the state charged him with felony stalking.
(R., Vol. I, pp.29-30.) The state specifically alleged Hoak committed felony
stalking by:
[Rlepeatedly writing letters to Kathryn Hendricks and sending them
through third parties, by calling Kathryn Hendricks through a third
party, andlor by causing her phone to ring repeatedly or
continuously regardless of whether a conversation ensued and
where the Defendant's actions constituting the offense are in
violation of a no contact order in Ada County Case Number
M0600110 andlor the Defendant has previously been convicted of
Domestic Battery, I.C. 518-918, involving the same victim as the
present offense within seven (7) years notwithstanding the form of
the judgment or withheld judgment.
(R., Vol. I, pp.29-30.)
The state also filed an Information Part II alleging Hoak is a persistent
violator. (R., Vol. I, pp.119-20, 151-53.)
Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b).

(R., Vol. I, pp.61-62.)

In that notice, the state

identified the "general nature of the evidence" as (1) statements by Kathy
regarding Hoak's "prior threats on her life and well being;" (2) statements
"regarding past reported and unreported physical abuse;" (3) statements
"regarding the methods in which [Hoak] violated past no contact orders;" (4)
statements "regarding prior No Contact Order Violations which were dismissed or
unreported;" (5) "Judgments of Conviction of prior No Contact Order violations
and crimes committed against Kathy Hendricks under Chapter 18 Title 9 of the
Idaho Code;" and (6) "statements by Kathy Hendricks regarding verbal abuse,
forced sex, and property damage inflicted by" Hoak. (R., Vol. I, pp.61-62.) The

state filed a memorandum in support of its 404(b) notice further elaborating on
the evidence it intended to present. (R., Vol. I, pp.63-82.)
Hoak filed an objection, arguing that "any events that occurred or are
alleged to have occurred outside of th[e] time frame [alleged in the indictment]
are irrelevant." (R., Voi. I, p.98.)

Hoak also objected on the grounds that

admission of the evidence would (1) violate I.R.E. 403 because it would "paint
[Hoak] with a broad brush as a previously convicted criminal and a violent
person," and (2) violate I.R.E. 404(b) because, he claimed, none of the evidence
satisfied the "specific exceptions described in Rule 404(b)." (R., Vol. I, pp.98107.)
The district court ultimately determined the majority of Hoak's prior
conduct was admissible to demonstrate why the incidents underlying the stalking
charge would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress, which is
an element of the crime. (Trial Tr., p.46, L.3 - p.47, L.4, p.49, L.?3 - p.51, L.l,
p.54, L.17 - p.58, L.9.) The court, however, precluded evidence of the fact of
Hoak's prior convictions in the state's case in chief. (Trial Tr., p.66, L.13 - p.67,
L.15.) The court also gave several limiting instructions regarding the limited
purpose for which the "prior bad act" evidence could be considered. (Trial Tr.,
p.131, Ls.17-22, p.195, L.20
Instruction No. 20.)

-

p.196, L.5, p.529, L.19

-

p.530, L.8; Jury

.

A jury convicted Hoak of felony stalking and of being a persistent violator.
(R., Vol. 11, pp.216-18.) The court imposed a unified life sentence with ten years

fixed.

(R., Vol. II, pp.244-46, 272-74.) Hoak timely appealed.

pp.250-52.)

(R., Vol. 11,

ISSUE
Hoak states the issue' on appeal as:
Did the district court err by admitting testimony regarding prior bad
acts of Mr. Hoak because their probative value, individually, or
viewed cumulatively, was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Hoak failed to establish error in the admission of evidence offered to prove
Hoak's course of conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial
emotional distress?

' In addition to the Appellant's Brief filed by counsel, Hoak filed a pro se
"Supplement Brief." Hoak has not, however, obtained permission to do so. The
state, therefore, will not respond to the issues raised therein at this time.

ARGUMENT
Hoak Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Admittinq Evidence Of
His Prior Conduct In Order To Establish His Stalkina Behavior Would Cause A
Reasonable Person Substantial Emotional Distress
A.

Introduction
During trial the district court permitted the state to present evidence of

Hoak's prior conduct toward the victim in order to place his stalking behavior in
context and establish that Hoak's stalking behavior would cause a reasonable
person substantial emotional distress, as required by the stalking statute, I.C. 3
18-7906. On appeal, Hoak challenges only the district court's determination that
the probative value of Hoak's prior conduct was not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

Specifically, Hoak

argues that although "some" of Hoak's prior conduct was "probative," it was
unduly prejudicial due to its "sheer volume, nature, and degree." (Appellant's
Brief, p.11.) Hoak's argument fails on the law and the facts.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de novo.

State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)
(citations omitted). However, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the
district court's determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

C.

Evidence Of Hoak's Prior Conduct Was Not Undulv Preiudicial
Evidence is admissible if it is relevant so long as it is not unduly prejudicial

or otherwise subject to exclusion. I.R.E. 402, 403. On appeal, Hoak does not
challenge the district court's determination that evidence of his prior conduct was
relevant, but instead argues only that the district court abused its discretion when
it determined the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (Appellant's Brief, p.10 ("It is the
second prong of the analysis that is at issue for this Court.").) Although Hoak
"admit[s] some of [the] history of his relationship with Ms. Hendricks was
probative in assisting the jury to determine whether [he] was acting 'maliciously
and knowingly' and whether his course of conduct would case a reasonable
person substantial emotional distress," he claims the district court erred in its
prejudice analysis because, he asserts, "the sheer volume, nature, and degree of
the prior bad acts is sufficient to 'rouse the jury to overmastering hostility."'
(Appellant's Brief, p.11 (quoting State v. Winkler, 112 ldaho 917, 736 P.2d 1371
(Ct. App. 1987).) Thus, Hoak concludes, "the district court erred in permitting the
state to introduce any evidence of [his] prior bad acts." (Appellant's Brief, p.14
(emphasis added).) Hoak's argument fails as a matter of law.
In determining whether relevant evidence should be excluded as unduly
prejudicial, the "trial court's inquiry focuses on the unfairness of that prejudice."
State v. McGuire, 135 ldaho 535, 540, 20 P.3d 719, 724 (Ct. App. 2001) (citation
omitted). It is not enough that the evidence is merely prejudicial since "most
probative evidence offered by the state in a criminal prosecution" is prejudicial;

rather, the inquiry is whether the unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence.

Id.

Although Hoak cites the correct legal standard applicable to a prejudice
analysis, he fails to apply that standard and instead argues that even though
"some" of his prior conduct was probative, none of it was admissible due to "the
sheer volume, nature, and degree of the prior bad acts." (Appellant's Brief,
pp.10-11, 14.) The state is unaware of any authority, and Hoak cites none, that
supports the proposition that a// probative and relevant prior bad act evidence
should be excluded as unduly prejudicial simply because there is too much of it.
While I.R.E. 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if it will result
in the "needless presentation of cumulative evidence," this does not mean that no
evidence may be presented whenever there is a possibility that there might be
cumulative evidence. If Hoak believes that specific evidence should have been
excluded because it was cumulative, he must identify that evidence and explain
why it was needlessly cumulative. It is not enough for Hoak to simply block
quote the prosecutor's opening statement (which is not evidence), and outline the
victim's testimony, and then claim none of the evidence regarding Hoak's prior
conduct was admissible on the grounds it was too voluminous or "massive and
overwhelming." (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-14.)
Even if this Court considers the cumulative effect of Hoak's prior bad acts,
Hoak cannot establish error. In order to prove Hoak was guilty of stalking, the
state had to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hoak "knowingly and
maliciously" "[e]ngage[d] in a course of conduct that seriously alarm[ed],

annoy[ed] or harasse[d] [Kathy],'' and was such that it "would cause a reasonable
person substantial emotional distress." I.C.

5 18-7906(l)(a).

In determining that

Hoak's prior conduct was not unduly prejudicial the district court recognized the
issue as a matter of discretion, and acted within the bounds of that discretion, in
concluding that evidence of Hoak's prior conduct was necessary to demonstrate
why a reasonable person in Kathy's position would feel substantial emotional
distress. (TrialTr., p.46, L.5-p.47, L.lO, p.50, Ls.16-25, p.55, L.12-p.57, L.5.)
Hoak has failed to establish otherwise. & State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 59192, 181 P.3d 512, 517-18 (Ct. App. 2007) (concluding the trial court did not err in
admitting testimony on prior uncharged incidents of sexual misconduct because
the evidence "demonstrated [his] sexual disposition toward the young females in
his residence, which may not have been gleaned from evidence of any of the
incidents individually," thus, "[tlhe cumulative effect was . . . highly probative of
whether the charged conduct . . . was committed with the intent to satisfy his lust,
passions or sexual desire.")
The district court's analysis applied equally to the "allegations of rape and
substantial physical injury," which Hoak complains should not have been
admitted because those acts are "particularly damning." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.)
Hoak's prior physical abuse and sexual assault of Kathy was highly probative on
the issue of whether a reasonable person would suffer emotional distress as a
result of stalking behavior that might otherwise seem harmless. That those
particular acts may be "particularly damning" does not make them unduly

prejudicial and the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding as
much.
Hoak also argues that although "it was proper and necessary to instruct
the jury on how it could consider the prior bad act evidence, the limiting
instruction was wholly insufficient to cure the improper introduction of the highly
prejudicial and voluminous bad act evidence presented to the jury." (Appellant's
Brief, p.14.) Hoak's argument fails because it is based on a misunderstanding of
the purpose of the court's limiting instruction. The purpose of the district court's
limiting instruction was obviously not to "cure the improper introduction" of Hoak's
prior bad acts given the court's conclusion that the acts were admissible, i.e., not
"improper[ly] introduc[ed]." Rather, the purpose was to "instruct the jury on how it
could consider the prior bad act evidence" - a purpose Hoak acknowledges as
"proper and necessary." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.)
The cases Hoak relies on in support of his argument illustrate his
misunderstanding of the law. In Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)
(citations and quotations omitted, emphasis added), the United States Supreme
Court did indeed state, as Hoak notes, that a reviewing court will "normally
presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence
inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the
jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that
the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant." (Appellant's
Brief, p.15.)

However, it is readily apparent that this presumption relates to

curative instructions given when the trial court concludes evidence has been

improperly admitted, not limiting instructions given in relation to properly admitted
evidence.
United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the other case
upon which Hoak relies, is also inapplicable. Daniels was charged with "armed
bank robbery, carrying a pistol without a license, and possession of a firearm
subsequent to a felony conviction."

Id. at

1113-1114. The trial court declined

Daniel's request to sever the armed robbery and carrying a pistol without a
license charges from the felon in possession of a firearm charge.

Id. As a result,

the jury heard evidence of Daniel's prior felony conviction, which was admitted to
I

prove the felon in possession charge, and which would have been inadmissible
in relation to the armed robbery and carrying a pistol without a license charges
Id. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in failing to sever due
to the prejudice that may have resulted from the admission of Daniel's prior

I

conviction.

Id.

In analyzing Daniels' claim of error, the court noted, "There is a high risk of
undue prejudice whenever, as in this case, joinder of counts allows evidence of
other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which the
evidence would otherwise be inadmissible." 770 F.2d at 1116. Thus. the
problem "pose[dj" in Daniels was "the admissibility of a prior felony conviction
because of joinder of an ex-felon offense," and the court's comments "concerning
the efficacy of jury instructions in curing the prejudice caused by the introduction
of other crimes evidence," were made in that context. 770 F.2d at 1117-1118
Because Hoak's case involves a single charge and does not involve the

admission of prior bad act evidence not admissible as to that charge, Daniels is
neither on point nor persuasive. Moreover, the court in Daniels went on to affirm
the trial court, noting its "sufficiently scrupulous regard for the defendant's rights,"
and thereby implicitly reaffirming the propriety of limiting instructions in relation to
404(b) evidence. & at 1118.
Hoak physically battered and threatened Kathy's well-being over a period
of several months, continuing to do so despite the existence of a no contact order
i

and even after Kathy broke up with him. This history, including the fact that Hoak
had been undeterred by incarceration and the issuance of a no contact order,
was highly probative and necessary to provide context for why Hoak's stalking
behavior caused Kathy emotional distress, and why that distress was

I

reasonable. Any prejudice that may have flowed from the admission of this
evidence was by no means unfair, much less sufficient to substantially outweigh
the probative value of the evidence. Hoak has failed to establish otherwi~e.~

Because there was no error in this case, there is no need to engage in a
harmless error analysis. However, the state notes the inconsistency between
Hoak's argument that the error was not harmless because, he claims, "the State
offered very little evidence such that a jury could have found him guilty of felony
stalking" since the "only successful 'communications' with Ms. Hendricks
occurred when Ms. Hendricks voluntarily obtained letters Mr. Hoak sent to a third
party" (Appellant's Brief, p.17), and his assertion that the state should not have
been permitted to introduce any of Hoak's prior bad acts "when viewed in
conjunction with the possible evidence the jury could have properly considered in
finding Mr. Hoak guilty of felony stalking." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Hoak's convictions.
DATED this 28'h day of January 2009.

n

J ~ $ S I C AM. LORELLO
Attorney General
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